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COMMENT 
A CRITIQUE OF THE OHIO PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS LAW 
WILLL<\M W. VAN ALsTYNE* 
Many people are willing to fight discrimination but preferably 
that which e...Osts across the street or across the world rather than 
that in their own backyards. We must build a better example here 
at home-in Ohio. 
GOVERNOR MICHAEL v. DISALLE1 
Since 1884, Ohio has modestly identified itself with the philosophy 
that enterprises which solicit the general public for private profit 
necessarily assume some responsibility not to deny arbitrarily the 
public's right to rely on their services and facilities.2 In adhering to 
this position, Ohio has not pursued a novel or maverick policy as 
twenty-six states presently maintain laws which forbid discrimination 
in places of public accommodation.3 Indeed, the conservative char-
* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University. Materials 
for this Comment were provided by third year seminar students at the College of 
Law; their assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 Ohio Civil Rights Conference Proceedings 8 (multil. 1960). 
2 81 Ohio Laws 15 (1884): "Whereas, it is essential to just government that we 
recognize and protect all men as equal before the law, and that a democratic form of 
government should mete out equal and e.'ffict justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, 
color, persuasion, religious or political; and it being the appropriate object of legislation 
to enact great fundamental principles into law therefore, SECTION 1. Be it enacted by 
tlze General Assembly of tlze State of Olzio, that all persons within the jurisdiction of 
said state shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the acco=odations, 
advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land and water, 
theaters and other places of public amusement subject only to the conditions and 
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color. 
SECTION 2. That any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the 
foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons applicable alike to all 
citizens of every race and color, and regardless of color and race, the full enjoyment 
of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges, in said section 
enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offense, forfeit 
and pay a sum not to e."'l:ceed $100 to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in 
any court of competent jurisdiction, in the county where said offense was co=itted; 
and shall also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
conviction thereof, shall be fined not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100), or shall be 
imprisoned not more than thirty days or both; and provided further, that a judgment in 
favor of the party aggrieved, or punishment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to 
either prosecution respectively." 
3 For full citation to laws of all twenty-six jurisdictions, see Greenberg, Race 
Relations and American Law 275-79 (1959). See also, "State Laws and Agencies for 
Civil Rights," Report of the Governor's Comm. on Human Rights, WISconsin, 1960. 
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acter of the Ohio public accommodations law has been relatively un-
changed since 1894.4 Both the coverage and remedies provided by the 
law are extremely abbreviated in comparison with the general trend 
of legislation in other jurisdictions,5 notwithstanding substantial evi-
dence that discrimination in places of public accommodation exists 
throughout Ohio. 6 
The doubtful success of the law is attributable both to a number 
of deficiencies apparent on the face of the statute, and to the diffidence 
or reserved attitude of the courts. The purpose of this comment is to 
examine the more striking inadequacies of the law which inhibit it 
from eliminating racial and religious discrimination in places of public 
accommodation.7 The following treatment briefly reviews the law 
with respect to: who is protected; who is forbidden from discriminat-
ing; what kind of discrimination is proscribed; what constitutes a 
place of public accommodation; what remedies are available; what 
significance has section 2901.36 of the Ohio Revised Code. As an 
immediate point of reference, it may be well to set out the relevant 
sections of the Ohio Revised Code: 
Section 2901.35 Denial of privileges at restaurants, stores 
and other places by reason of color or race. 
No proprietor or his employee, keeper, or manager of an inn, 
restaurant, eating house, barber shop, public conveyance by air, 
land, or water, theater, store or other place for the sale of mer-
4 See 91 Ohio Laws 17 (1894), increasing the provision for punitive damages to a 
minimum of $50 and a maximum of $500, or a fine from $50 to $500 or imprisonment 
from 30 to 90 days, or both. A previous amendment enacted one month after the 
statute's promulgation (81 Ohio Laws 90 [1884]), added "accommodations" to the 
omnibus phrase, and listed restaurants, eating-houses, and barber shops. 
5 In 1959 the Unruh Civil Rights Act of California, (Calif. Stats. 1959}, ch. 1866, 
extended coverage of its public accommodations law (Cal. Civ. Code § 51), to forbid 
discrimination because of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin in any business 
establishment, a violation giving rise to an action for minimum damages of $250. See 
5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 249 (1960). A recent state attorney general's opinion construes this 
phrase very broadly, even to include the facilities and services supplied by real estate 
brokers and salesmen. 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 255 (1960}. 
The current New York law (Civil Rts. Law § 40) lists more than fifty kinds of 
places of public accommodations in which discrimination is proscribed, enforceable 
through a civil suit with minimum damages of $100 or an administrative procedure 
through a state commission which possesses power to subpoena witnesses and issue 
cease and desist orders. N.Y. Exec. L. Art. 12, §§ 290-301 (1959). The New Jersey 
statute is similar. For a comparison of these and other statutes, see "State Laws and 
Agencies for Civil Rights," Report of the Governor's Comm. on Human Rights, 
Wisconsin, 1960; Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 101-114 (1959). 
6 See "Discrimination in Public Accommodations in Ohio" section I of the Report 
of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (multi!. Dec. 1960}. 
7 For an earlier review of the Ohio public accommodations law, see Note, 12 U. Cine. 
L. Rev. 60 (1938}. 
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chandise, or any other place of public accommodation or amuse-
ment, shall deny to a citizen, except for reasons applicable alike to 
all citizens and regardless of color or race, the full enjoyment of 
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges thereof, and 
no person shall aid or incite the denial thereof. 
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than 
fifty nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not less than 
thirty nor more than ninety days, or both and shall pay not less 
than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved 
thereby to be recovered in any court in the county where the 
violation was committed. 
Section 2901.36 Bar to prosecution. 
Either a judgment in favor of the person aggrieved, or the 
punishment of the offender upon an indictment under section 
2901.35 of the Revised Code, is a bar to further prosecution for a 
violation of such section. 
I. WHO Is PROTECTED BY THE STATUTE 
203 
The statute provides only that discrimination against "a citizen" 
is unlawful. It is not to be supposed that the phrase would be liberally 
construed, since the judicial tendency has been to restrict the statute.8 
It is therefore quite clear that visiting aliens, foreign travelers in Ohio, 
and the more that 1,000 foreign students attending Ohio colleges, do 
not come within the protection of the law. Their omission possibly is 
attributable to legislative oversight in earlier years when fewer stu-
dents and visitors came to Ohio from Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East; there would otherwise appear to be little reason to sanction 
racial discrimination against these visitors, while forbidding it with 
respect to local residents. Since these international visitors to Ohio 
probably contribute substantially to the image of America projected in 
their own countries, there is every reason to make the law uniform to 
protect them equally with our own citizens. 
In the absence of any reported decision disposing of the issue, 
it is doubtful whether an organization, club, or association would be 
defined as "a citizen" under a conservative interpretation of the phrase. 
The statute may therefore produce the incongruous consequence of 
sanctioning a racially inspired refusal to accommodate a conference, 
meeting, luncheon, or convention when the request for accommoda-
tions is made by an organization, even while forbidding discrimination 
against each of the club members if they were to enter a request, or 
to present themselves, individually. 
8 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Coney Island, 54 Ohio Op. 112 (C.P. 1954), rev'd, 165 Ohio 
St. ISO, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956); Harvey v. Sissie, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410 
(1936); Hargo v. Meyers, 4 Ohio C.C.R. 275, 2 Ohio C.C. Dec. 543 (1889). And 
see discussion which follows. 
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Finally, the language of the statute leaves the question unsettled 
as to whether all American citizens are protected against discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation in Ohio, or whether only 
citizens (roughly equivalent to permanent residents) of Ohio itself 
are protected. Since Ohio state citizenship is not characteristic of 
transient visitors, tourists, or travelers through Ohio, and since these 
persons doubtlessly comprise a substantial portion of hotel, motel, 
restaurant, and theater trade, the statute may in fact tolerate discrim-
ination in some of the very establishments it otherwise explicitly lists 
as places of public accommodation which are ostensibly forbidden 
from discriminating. 
II. WHo Is FoRBIDDEN FROM DisCRIMINATING 
The face of the statute limits the class of potential defendants to 
proprietors and their employees, keepers, and managers. The reference 
in the second paragraph which makes it an offense to discriminate, 
"whoever" that person may be, should probably be construed in terms 
of the particular parties expressly designated, and therefore adds 
nothing to the scope of the statute. In the absence of cases to the 
contrary, it is arguable that lessors, trustees, and others in whom 
ownership of places of public accommodation may inhere and who 
profit from the operation of such establishments, but who have as-
signed or otherwise delegated proprietary and managerial interests 
to others, cannot be held responsible. Yet the intimate connection of 
such persons with their enterprises and their ultimate power to in-
fluence the policies of such establishments, suggest they should be 
included. 
The statute is also patently ambiguous with respect to impersonal 
legal entities which may operate places of public accommodation under 
business or :firm names. Although one Ohio court held that a corpora-
tion was a "person"9 under an earlier version of the statute/0 another 
court held that a partnership was not a "person" and thus could not 
be sued in its :firm name for acts committed by its employees.11 The 
phrase '' whoever" recently has been substituted for "person"; since 
the referent of "whoever," viz. "a proprietor," might include a corpora-
tion or partnership, it is presently arguable that business entities may 
ll Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 4 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 49, 14 Ohio C.C. 
Dec. 135 (1902). 
10 In 1902, at the time of the Johnson case, the statute forbade any "person" from 
violating the terms of the statute. The word has since been dropped, raising some 
possible question as to the vitality of the Johnson decision. 
ll Ha.rgo v. Meyers, supra note 8. 
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be held liable.12 The lack of judicial precedent under the current 
statute, however, and the checkered treatment of the law in prior 
cases, suggest that legislative clarification is desirable. 
Finally, there is the knotty problem of proving an agency rela-
tionship between an employee or other representative of a proprietor, 
and the proprietor himself. Without alleging and proving that such 
a relationship exists, an aggrieved party cannot secure even the slight 
relief presently afforded by the statute against proprietors, managers, 
or keepers who determine the policy for their business establishments. 
While such proof may be easy where the manager is present and ac-
tually participates in the discriminatory acts/3 such a case is obviously 
atypical. The courts have generally taken a parochial view of a 
proprietor's responsibility, confronting the plaintiff with an extremely 
difficult burden of proof.14 Since the actual scope of employment is 
best known to the proprietor, and since the facts which determine 
the legal relationship between management and subordinate repre-
sentatives of an establishment may be peculiarly within the knowledge 
and control of these parties, it may be reasonable to entertain a 
rebuttable presumption that an agency relationship does exist when 
discrimination is manifested by one apparently acting in a representa-
tive capacity for a place of public accommodation. Moreover, it may 
be desirable to give statutory effect to the dictum of one Ohio court 
that where an employee is otherwise acting within the scope of his 
employment, the employer cannot escape his own liability under the 
law even if the employee discriminates contrary to the employer's 
instructions.H; 
III. WHAT KIND OF DISCRIMINATION Is PROSCRIBED 
The statute is apparently limited to discrimination based on 
"color or race," and thus ignores discrimination in places of public 
accommodation with respect to religion, ancestry, and national 
origin.16 The omission is especially puzzling since there would seem 
12 The argument has been advanced at 12 U. Cine. L. Rev. 62-63 (1938), but never 
acted upon by the courts. 
13 See, e.g., Puritan Lunch v. Forman, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 289 (1918). 
14 See, e.g., Lyons v. Akron Skating Rink Co., 18 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 202, 32 Ohio 
C.C. Dec. 690 (1908); Anderson v. Rawlings, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 381, 10 Ohio C.C. 
Dec. 112 (1899). Note, also, that in any criminal proceeding brought under the law, 
the state must prove the material facts beyond a reasonable doubt, and not merely by 
a preponderance of the evidence. For other cases evidencing the courts' conservative 
construction of the law, see supra note 8 and infra note 26. 
lu Davis v. Euclid Theatre Co., 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 495, 32 Ohio C.C. 
Dec. 690 (1911). 
16 But see Anderson v. Ohio, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 61, 40 Ohio C.C.R. 510 (1918), 
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to be no sound argument to support the law forbidding the indulgence 
of prejudice based on the adventitious difference of race or color, and 
tolerating the indulgence of prejudice based on equivalently irrelevant 
differences of religion, ancestry, or national origin. The explanation is 
not to be found in the fact that the original law of 1884 responded 
principally to the state's concern for fair treatment of Negroes, be-
cause the preamble to the original public accommodations law ex-
pressed the state's determination to eliminate discrimination based 
upon "nativity" and "religion or political persuasion,1117 as well as 
discrimination based on race or color. Since the state has regarded 
discrimination on account of religious, ancestral, or ethnological dif-
ferences just as repugnant to its policy on fair employment practices 
as discrimination on account of race or color / 8 consistency would 
require that the public accommodations law be expanded commen-
surately. 
Startling as the thought may be, the public accommodations law 
apparently does not prohibit total segregation even in the specific 
establishments listed in the law! What section 2901.35 proscribes is 
the denial of the "full enjoyment" of accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, or privileges of a place of public accommodation. The 
substantive content of "full enjoyment" is not to be construed accord-
ing to federal constitutional definitions of 1954 or 1960,19 however, but 
according to an assessment of the legislature's purpose at the time of 
where the conviction of a dance hall owner who excluded a Jewish person was upheld. 
The opinion contains no discussion of the basis for including this type of protection 
within the statute. 
17 See supra. note 1. 
18 Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02 (Supp. 1959). 
19 That is, the shift in the Supreme Court's definition of "equal protection" under 
the fourteenth amendment, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), would presumably not operate to change the content of "full enjoyment" in 
the state law, especially if a contrary interpretation accords 'vith the ascertainable 
intent of the Ohio legislature when it last modified the state law. The effect of Brown is 
merely to bar segregation in state owned, leased, operated, or substantially assisted 
enterprises. There is no reason why it should operate so as to require that the states 
impose on private persons the same standard of equal protection to which the state 
itself is subject, especially since judicial modification of statutes is less likely than 
judicial modification of constitutional provisions which otherwise cannot be easily 
updated by amendment. That fourteenth amendment standards do not affect "private" 
activity, see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), although state sanction of private 
discrimination has since been held to offend the fourteenth amendment, Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Black v. Cutter Laboratory, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) 
(dissenting opinion), and state inaction has occasionally been equated with state action 
where responsibility could be easily attached to a particular state officer; Picking v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); 
United States v. Catlette, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943). 
1961] COMMENT 207 
the law's enactment.20 In this setting, the phrase "full enjoyment" 
would clearly include the right to have access to facilities which are 
physically equal to those available to all other persons,21 but it might 
not forbid "mere" segregation because of the reluctance of the early 
courts to regard even compulsory separation as essentially odious 
standing alone.22 Thus a description of the law in Ohio Jurisprudence 
2d states: 
The mere separation of the races by a common carrier involves no 
discrimination in the invidious sense contemplated by the Civil 
Rights Statute if each race is afforded substantially equal comforts, 
conveniences, and accommodations.23 
Since the compulsory isolation of minority citizens has, for some 
time, been determined to have the same reprehensible effects as other, 
less subtle, forms of discrimination, and since more recent Ohio legisla-
tion in the employment fields includes segregation within the definition 
of proscribed discrimination,24 the anachronism of section 2901.35 
should be corrected. 
IV. WHAT CoNSTITUTES A PLACE oF PuBLic AccoMMODATION 
A glance at the statute discloses that the specific enumeration of 
places of public accommodation is extremely brief, obviously limited 
far short of all establishments which generally solicit public patronage 
for private profit. Transportation terminals, sports arenas, hospitals, 
soda fountains, and bars would appear to be indistinguishable from 
public conveyances, theaters, and stores with respect to the policy of 
the law, yet they are omitted from the list of designated places of 
public accommodation. 
It is possible that some of these enterprises might come under 
the general omnibus phrase "or any other place of public accommoda-
tion or amusement,"25 but such a construction is not entirely likely. 
20 See Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231 (5th syllabus), and see generally, 82 
C.J.S. "Statutes" § 321, n.25 at 568 (1953). 
21 See, e.g., Guy v. Tri-State Amusement Co., 28 Ohio Ct. App. 231 (1917); Puritan 
Lunch v. Forman, supra note 13. 
22 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and see discussion in Civil Rights 
Cases, supra note 19. The effort of the Ohio courts in the cases cited in note 25, 
i~tjra, to explain in what fashion the facilities extended to Negroes were not merely 
separate but physirolly unequal, also implies that "mere" segregation would not have 
constituted a denial of "full enjoyment." 
23 9 Ohio Jur. 2d 203, "Civil Rights" § 18 (1954); the current supplement 
suggests no modification of the 1954 view. 
24 See supra note 18. 
25 Places of public accommodation not named explicitly in § 2901.35, but which 
have been held to fall within the omnibus clause, include: a private amusement park, 
Fletcher v. Coney Island, 54 Ohio Op. 112, rev'd on other grounds, 165 Ohio St. 150, 
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Because the statute is partly in derogation of common law, because 
it is partly penal in character, and because of the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis, the courts have generally tended to restrict the scope of the 
omnibus phrase.26 Thus, retail stores were held not to be places of 
public accommodation,27 necessitating a statutory amendment28 to bring 
them within the statute. Similarly, even though the statute explicitly 
included inns, restaurants, and eating houses at the time, an Ohio court 
held that a soda fountain within a candy store was not included within 
the omnibus phrase.29 
Even if a change were suddenly to be signalled in the judicial 
treatment of the omnibus phrase,30 the policy of providing those 
subject to the law with clear notice of their responsibility, as an 
essential element of fundamental fairness, would suggest that a more 
explicit, symmetrical list of places of public accommodation ought to 
be provided. 
Since the statute is limited to places of "public" accommodation, 
presumably it does not include distinctly private establishments organ-
ized and managed by a regular, dues-paying membership. In recogni-
tion of the distinctions that such establishments do not solicit general 
patronage for profit, and that they are formed for non-commercial 
reasons which may involve close, social associations, these groups may 
legitimately not lie within the purpose of the statute. The division 
between "public" and "private" is sufficiently indistinct, however, that 
the exemption of private organizations tends to encourage evasive 
schemes of entrepreneurs through the organization of spurious clubs.31 
Because knowledge and evidence of the actual character of a particular 
134 N.E.2d 371 (1956) ; a golf course, Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 56 Ohio 
L. Abs. 222, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1950); a bowling alley, Johnson v. Humphrey 
Pop Corn Co., supra note 9; a dance hall, Anderson v. Ohio, supra note 16; a motion 
picture theater, Guy v. Tri-State Amusement Co., S1tPra note 21. 
26 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Coney Island, 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956); 
Rice v. Rinaldo, 44 Ohio Op. 286, 95 N.E.2d 30 (C.P. 1950), ajj'd, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 
119 N.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1951); Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 
31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919); Harvey v. Sissie, supra note 8; Tate v. Eidelman, 32 
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 478 (C.P. 1934); Hargo v. Meyers, supra note 8. 
27 Harvey v. Sissie, supra note 8. 
28 Gen. Code § 12940, 117 Ohio Laws 271 (1937). 
29 Deuwell v. Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 30 Ohio Dec. 510 (C.P. Franklin 
Co. 1912). 
30 See, e.g., Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., supra note 25 where the court 
included a golf club as a place of public acco=odation, and where it granted injunctive 
relief, notwithstanding the claim that the club was a private association for members 
only. But see Fletcher v. Coney Island, supra note 26. 
31 Contpare Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 490, 5 Race Rei. 
L. Rep. 831 (Cal. D.C.A. 1960), with the Gillespie case, supra note 25. 
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establishment is frequently within the exclusive control of its owners, 
a reasonable precaution against evasive arrangements might require 
that respondents should assume the burden of proving the distinctly 
private nature of an establishment which otherwise has been proved to 
cater for profit to large segments of the general public. 
v. WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE 
A. The Criminal Sanction 
Section 2901.35 provides that a violation is punishable by a fine 
from $50 to $500 and/or incarceration from thirty to ninety days. 
Notwithstanding the obvious inference one might draw initially that the 
threat of imprisonment should certainly operate as an effective deter-
rent, these penal sanctions have proved to be virtually worthless.82 
Since 1884, there has been but one reported case where the criminal 
sanction was employed, and that case arose in 1918.83 It would appear 
extremely doubtful that proprietors of places of public accommoda-
tion would be much deterred by knowledge of this record. Although 
the matter is necessarily speculative/4 failure of the criminal law may 
involve the following considerations: 
1. Actions can be brought only by local prosecutors who may be 
reluctant to implement the statute because: 
(a) the complaining witnesses are usually persons of little 
influence. 
(b) the accused may have considerable property and influence. 
(c) the case has little political value due to the unpopularity of 
the law. 
(d) convictions may be difficult to obtain, because: 
(1) a jury trial is mandatory on defendant's request; 
the jury may be hostile to the complaining witness's 
cause, or understandably reluctant to find a verdict 
that may result in imprisonment. 
(2) the burden of proof in a criminal proceeding is one 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than 
proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 
2. The public character of a criminal proceeding is likely to attract 
unwanted publicity to the complaining witness's grievance, dis-
couraging the filing of complaints. 
B. The Civil Sanction 
It is most difficult to assess the efficacy of the civil remedy which 
provides for damages from $50 to $500 because: (a) not all actions 
32 See Ohio Civil Rights Conference Proceedings at p. 46 (multi!. 1960). 
33 Anderson v. Ohio, supra note 16. There may be, of course, other instances among 
courts of original jurisdiction whose decisions are not published, although one might 
e;,.pect that these would be correspondingly few. 
84 On the lack of success of criminal and civil remedies generally, see Note, 74 
Harv. L. Rev. 526 (1961); Note, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 986 (1939). 
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in the lower state courts are reported; (b) the extent of discrimination 
in places of public accommodation had not been quantified or even 
surveyed until recently; (c) presumably, cases of this character may 
frequently be settled out of court to save costs and avoid publicity. 
It is, however, difficult to imagine how the civil remedy could be 
fully effective in view of the following considerations: 
(a) the minimum recovery of $50 has been unchanged since 
1894, even though the dollar has diminished in value by more 
than two-thirds. 
(b) suits must be brought wholly at the private expense of the 
plaintiff who will probably be required to employ the services 
of an attorney. The cost of financing litigation which is unlikely 
even to cover expenses must deter aggrieved parties from 
pursuing their exclusive remedies.35 
(c) attorneys may be reluctant to handle cases as financially un-
attractive as these, especially with respect to a clientele less 
able than others to retain them e.."l:cept on a contingency fee 
basis of small appeal. 
(d) it is questionable whether proprietors find the hazard of an 
occasional, trifling judgment any significant deterrent to their 
discriminatory practices; a modest out-of-court settlement 
may be viewed simply as part of the cost of doing "business." 
VI. WHAT SIGNIFICANCE HAs SECTION 2901.36 
Section 2901.36 provides that either a successful private suit for 
damages or a successful criminal proceeding will bar an aggrieved 
party from pursuing his alternative remedy. This obligatory election 
of remedies is highly exceptional, since the general rule proceeds on 
the theory that wholly different interests are vindicated in the two 
proceedings. Punishment by the state for an infraction of its policy 
ordinarily is no obstacle to a civil proceeding which seeks to redress a 
private loss. Since even the successful prosecution of a discriminatory 
proprietor does little to compensate his victim for the emotional dis-
tress, humiliation, and inconvenience caused by the act of discrimina-
tion, a separate suit for damages ought to be allowed. 
35 The emphasis is properly on the fact that a suit for damages is the exclusive 
remedy, since Fletcher v. Coney Island, supra note 8 (overruling sub silentio the 
Gillespie case), held that equitable relief is not available under § 2901.35, notwith-
standing that the trend in other jurisdictions was to the contrary, (see the dissent), 
and notwithstanding the persuasion of the lower court that: "It is evident that neither 
a recovery at law of the damages permitted by the statute, regardless of how many 
times the plaintiff recovers, nor convictions and punishments of the defendant, regard-
less of how often obtained and imposed, will restore to the plaintiff in this case the thing 
which the legislature clearly intended to give her and of which the wrongful acts of 
the defendant have and will continue to deprive her, namely, the right to enter the park 
and the opportunity fully to enjoy its facilities." 54 Ohio Op. at 117. 
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Even in regard to election of remedies, however, the statute lacks 
symmetry. Thus, it is not at all clear that an unsuccessful criminal 
prosecution would bar a subsequent civil suit, especially since the 
state's failure to satisfy the high standard of proof required in criminal 
cases may be no indication that the plaintiff would not prevail in a 
separate proceeding involving a lower standard. Equally, it is unclear 
whether an unsuccessful civil action would bar a subsequent criminal 
prosecution, although there may be slightly more reason to suggest 
that it might. 
With respect to the possibility of multiple prosecutions for "one" 
offense, at least one court has suggested that a proprietor may be liable 
once for the acts of an employee who was acting within the scope of 
his authority, and again for inciting the employee to discriminate, 
even though the Negro customer had encountered but one instance of 
exclusion.36 The effect of section 2901.36 on other notions of double 
jeopardy, through barring "further prosecution for a violation," is 
typically obscure. For instance, the statute provides no clue as to 
where the line must be drawn in the following sequence of events to 
insulate a proprietor from several causes of action: 
(a) Plaintiff is denied admission to a single motion picture theater 
twice, the second act of discrimination occurring two weeks 
after the first; 
(b) Plaintiff is denied admission to a single motion picture theater 
twice, on consecutive days, with different films playing. 
(c) Plaintiff is denied admission to a single motion picture theater 
twice, on consecutive days, while the same film is playing. 
(d) Plaintiff is denied admission to a single motion picture theater 
twice on the same day. 
(e) Two plaintiffs are denied admission at the same instant at a 
motion picture theater . . . (etc.) . 
The point, of course, is not to suggest that courts will be unable 
to draw the line, but to make clear that the choice of remedies 
presently available is not responsive to the policy which accounts for 
the law. That policy would not be well served even by a construction 
of the statute which would encourage individuals to turn their badges 
of minority identification to profit, by allowing them to collect from 
a proprietor for every act of discrimination in an interminable 
series.37 Rather, what is required is the availability of administrative 
relief to insure that access to places of public accommodation shall 
not be denied for arbitrary reasons.38 Provision for such relief 
36 See Davis v. Euclid Theater Co., supra note 15. 
37 Such a possibility e.-cists under the current law, according to a dictum in Young 
v. Pratt, 11 Ohio App. 346, 30 Ohio Ct. App. 589 (1919). 
as For an assessment of the success of administrative agencies in this area, see 
Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526 (1961). 
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from discriminatory employment practices is available under the New 
Fair Employment Practices Law of Ohio,39 and could easily be made 
a part of an expanded public accommodations law. In that event, some 
of the problems arising from sections 2901.35 and 2901.36 would 
disappear; continued refusal to admit either the original complainant 
or any other person in defiance of a cease and desist order issued on 
behalf of all persons similarly situated and on behalf of the state's own 
interest would be subject to contempt proceedings. Whether the legis-
lature will provide such a remedy, or whether it will otherwise repair 
Ohio's dilapidated law, however, depends on how seriously it heeds 
the Governor's admonition with which this comment began. 
39 See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.03-4112.06 (1959 Supp.). 
